

ENNEAD I. 2

I. 2. ON VIRTUES

Introductory Note

THIS treatise is No. 19 in Porphyry's chronological order; that is, it belongs to the group of twenty-one treatises which Plotinus had already written by his 59th year, when Porphyry joined him. It is a commentary on the passage from the *Theaetetus* (176A) cited at the beginning of the first chapter, and its object is to determine in what precise sense the virtues can be said to make us godlike. In pursuing this enquiry Plotinus, as often, makes great use of ideas taken from Aristotle, that the gods themselves cannot be said to possess moral virtue (cp. *Nicomachean Ethics* X. 8. 1178b) and that there are two kinds of virtue, intellectual and moral (cp. *Nicomachean Ethics* VI. 2. 1139a ff.)—a doctrine which seems to underlie and be the origin of Plotinus's own rather different doctrine of higher and lower virtue, in which there are also some Stoic elements. In chs. 1-3 Plotinus develops a very interesting and important doctrine of analogy.

Synopsis

We escape from the evils here below by becoming god-like by means of virtue. But what god does virtue make us like?—perhaps the lowest of the three great divine principles, Universal Soul. But does this really possess the cardinal virtues? It does not have civic or moral virtues, but these as well as the higher virtues must play their part in making us godlike (ch. 1). The divinities possess, not virtues as we have them, but the principles from which our virtues derive, and this is sufficient for us to speak of "likeness", which means something different when it is applied to the relationship of a derived thing

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to its origin from what it means when applied to the relationship of two derived things on the same level (chs. 1-3). The distinction between "civic" and "purifying" virtues (ch. 3). What precisely we mean by "purification" (ch. 4). Its effects on our higher and lower self (ch. 5). What the virtues are in the highest stage of our development, when we are completely free of our lower self, and no longer good men but gods (chs. 6-7).

I. 2. (19) ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΕΤΩΝ

1. Ἐπειδὴ τὰ κακὰ ἐνταῦθα καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, βούλεται δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ φυγεῖν τὰ κακὰ, φευκτέον ἐντεῦθεν. Τίς οὖν ἡ φυγή; θεῶ, φησιν, ὁμοιωθῆναι. Τοῦτο δέ, εἰ δίκαιοι καὶ ὄσιοι μετὰ φρονήσεως γενοίμεθα καὶ ὅλως ἐν ἀρετῇ. Εἰ οὖν ἀρετῇ ὁμοιούμεθα, ἄρα ἀρετὴν ἔχοντι; Καὶ δὴ καὶ τίνι θεῶ; Ἄρ' οὖν τῷ μᾶλλον δοκοῦντι ταῦτα ἔχειν καὶ δὴ τῇ τοῦ κόσμου ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ ἐν ταύτῃ ἡγουμένῳ ᾧ φρόνησις θαυμαστὴ ὑπάρχει; Καὶ γὰρ εὐλογον ἐνταῦθα ὄντας τούτῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι. Ἡ πρῶτον μὲν ἀμφισβητήσιμον, εἰ καὶ τούτῳ ὑπάρχουσι πᾶσαι· οἷον σώφρονι ἀνδρείῳ εἶναι, ᾧ μήτε τι δεινόν ἐστίν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐξώθεν· μήτε προσιόν ἡδὺ οὐ καὶ ἐπιθυμία ἂν γένοιτο μὴ παρόντος, ἢν' ἔχη ἢ ἔλη. Εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν ὀρέξει ἐστὶ τῶν νοητῶν ὧν καὶ αἱ ἡμέτεραι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡμῖν ἐκείθεν ὁ κόσμος καὶ αἱ ἀρεταί. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐκείνο ταύτας ἔχει; Ἡ οὐκ εὐλογον τὰς γε πολιτικὰς λεγομένας ἀρετὰς ἔχειν, φρόνησιν μὲν

¹ The text which Plotinus is quoting here is Plato, *Theaetetus* 176 A-B. He comments on it again at I. 8. 7, where he is discussing the necessary existence of evil in this lower world.

² Cp. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* X. 8. 1178b8-18.

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1. Since it is here that evils are, and "they must necessarily haunt this region," and the soul wants to escape from evils, we must escape from here. What, then, is this escape? "Being made like god," Plato says. And we become godlike "if we become righteous and holy with the help of wisdom," and are altogether in virtue.¹ If then it is virtue which makes us like, it presumably makes us like a being possessing virtue. Then what god would that be? Would it be the one that appears to be particularly characterised by the possession of virtue, that is, the soul of the universe and its ruling principle, in which there is a wonderful wisdom? It is reasonable to suppose that we should become like this principle, as we are here in its universe.

But, first of all, it is debatable whether this principle has all the virtues; whether, for instance, it is self-controlled and brave when it has nothing to frighten it, for there is nothing outside the universe, and nothing attractive can come to it which it has not already got, and produce a desire to have or get it.² But if this principle is in a state of aspiration towards the intelligible realities to which our aspirations too are directed, it is clear that our good order and our virtues also come from the intelligible. Has the intelligible, then, virtues? It is at any rate improbable that it has the virtues called "civic,"

περὶ τὸ λογιζόμενον, ἀνδρίαν δὲ περὶ τὸ θυμούμε-
 νον, σωφροσύνην δὲ ἐν ὁμολογίᾳ τινὶ καὶ συμφωνίᾳ
 ἐπιθυμητικοῦ πρὸς λογισμόν, δικαιοσύνην δὲ τὴν
 20 ἐκάστου τούτων ὁμοῦ οἰκειοπραγίαν ἀρχῆς
 πέρι καὶ τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ κατὰ τὰς
 πολιτικὰς ὁμοιούμεθα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὰς μείζους τῷ
 αὐτῷ ὀνόματι χρωμένας; Ἄλλ' εἰ κατ' ἄλλας,
 κατὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ὅλως οὐ; Ἡ ἄλογον μὴδ'
 ὅπως οὖν ὁμοιοῦσθαι κατὰ ταύτας—τούτους γοῦν
 25 καὶ θεῖους ἢ φήμη λέγει καὶ λεκτέον ἀμηγέπη
 ὁμοιωῦσθαι—κατὰ δὲ τὰς μείζους τὴν ὁμοίωσιν
 εἶναι. Ἄλλ' ἐκατέρως γε συμβαίνει ἀρετὰς ἔχειν
 κἂν εἰ μὴ τοιαύτας. Εἰ οὖν τις συγχωρεῖ, κἂν
 εἰ μὴ τοιαύτας, ὁμοιοῦσθαι δύνασθαι, ἄλλως ἡμῶν
 ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλλας, οὐδὲν κωλύει, καὶ μὴ πρὸς
 30 ἀρετὰς ὁμοιουμένων, ἡμᾶς ταῖς αὐτῶν ἀρεταῖς
 ὁμοιοῦσθαι τῷ μὴ ἀρετὴν κεκτημένῳ. Καὶ πῶς;
 Ὡδε· εἴ τι θερμότητος παρουσία θερμαίνεται,
 ἀνάγκη καὶ ὅθεν ἡ θερμότης ἐλήλυθε θερμαίνεσθαι;
 Καὶ εἴ τι πυρὸς παρουσία θερμόν ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη
 35 καὶ τὸ πῦρ αὐτὸ πυρὸς παρουσία θερμαίνεσθαι;
 Ἄλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὸ πρότερον εἶποι ἂν τις καὶ ἐν
 τῷ πῦρ εἶναι θερμότητα, ἀλλὰ σύμφυτον, ὥστε τὸν
 λόγον ποιεῖν τῇ ἀναλογίᾳ ἐπόμενον ἐπακτὸν μὲν
 τῇ ψυχῇ τὴν ἀρετὴν, ἐκείνῳ δέ, ὅθεν μιμησαμένη
 ἔχει, σύμφυτον· πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸς λόγον

¹ This description of the "civic" virtues is based on the discussion of the virtues in the ideal state in Plato, *Republic* IV 427E-434D.

practical wisdom which has to do with discursive reason, courage which has to do with the emotions, balanced control which consists in a sort of agreement and harmony of passion and reason, justice which makes each of these parts agree in "minding their own business where ruling and being ruled are concerned."¹ Then are we not made godlike by the civic virtues, but by the greater virtues which have the same names? But if by the others, are the civic virtues no help at all to this likeness? It is unreasonable to suppose that we are not made godlike in any way by the civic virtues but that likeness comes by the greater ones—tradition certainly calls men of civic virtue godlike and we must say that somehow or other they were made like by this kind of virtue. It is possible to have virtues on both levels, even if not the same kind of virtues. If then it is agreed that we can be made like even if that to which we are likened has not the same kind of virtue as ourselves, and we are differently related to different virtues, there is nothing to prevent us, even if we are not made like in regard to virtues, being made like by our own virtues to that which does not possess virtue. How? In this way: if something is made hot by the presence of heat, must that from which the heat comes also be heated? And if something is made hot by the presence of fire, must the fire itself be heated by the presence of fire? One might object in answer to the first argument that there is heat in fire, but as part of its nature, so that the argument, if it kept to its analogy, would make virtue something extraneous to the soul but part of the nature of that from which the soul receives it by imitation: and in answer to the argument from fire that it would

40 τὸ ἐκείνων ἀρετὴν εἶναι· ἀρετῆς δὲ ἀξιούμεν εἶναι
 μείζονα. Ἄλλ' εἰ μὲν οὐ μεταλαμβάνει ψυχὴ τὸ
 αὐτὸ ἦν τῷ ἀφ' οὗ, οὕτως ἔδει λέγειν· νῦν δὲ
 ἕτερον μὲν ἐκείνο, ἕτερον δὲ τοῦτο. Οὐδὲ γὰρ
 οἰκία ἢ αἰσθητὴ τὸ αὐτὸ τῇ νοητῇ, καίτοι ὁμοίωται
 καὶ τάξεως δὲ καὶ κόσμου μεταλαμβάνει ἢ οἰκία ἢ
 45 αἰσθητὴ κάκει ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστι τάξις οὐδὲ κόσμος
 οὐδὲ συμμετρία. Οὕτως οὖν κόσμου καὶ τάξεως καὶ
 ὁμολογίας μεταλαμβάνοντες ἐκείθεν καὶ τούτων
 ὄντων τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνθάδε, οὐ δεομένων δὲ τῶν ἐκεῖ
 ὁμολογίας οὐδὲ κόσμου οὐδὲ τάξεως, οὐδ' ἂν
 50 ἀρετῆς εἴη χρεία, καὶ ὁμοιούμεθα οὐδὲν ἦττον τοῖς
 ἐκεῖ δι' ἀρετῆς παρουσίαν. Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ μὴ
 ἀναγκαῖον κάκει ἀρετὴν εἶναι, ἐπεὶπερ ἡμεῖς
 ἀρετῇ ὁμοιούμεθα, ταυτί· δεῖ δὲ πειθῶ ἐπάγειν
 τῷ λόγῳ μὴ μένοντας ἐπὶ τῆς βίας.

2. Πρῶτον τοίνυν τὰς ἀρετὰς ληπτέον καθ' ἃς
 φαμεν ὁμοιοῦσθαι, ἵν' αὖ τὸ αὐτὸ εὖρωμεν ὃ παρ'
 ἡμῖν μὲν μίμημα ὃν ἀρετὴ ἐστίν, ἐκεῖ δὲ οἶον
 ἀρχέτυπον ὃν οὐκ ἀρετὴ, ἐπισημηνάμενοι ὡς ἢ
 5 ὁμοιώσις διττῇ· καὶ ἢ μὲν τις ταῦτόν ἐν τοῖς
 ὁμοίοις ἀπαιτεῖ, ὅσα ἐπίσης ὁμοίωται ἀπὸ τοῦ
 αὐτοῦ· ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ μὲν ὁμοίωται πρὸς ἕτερον,
 τὸ δὲ ἕτερόν ἐστι πρῶτον, οὐκ ἀντιστρέφον πρὸς
 ἐκείνο οὐδὲ ὅμοιον αὐτοῦ λεγόμενον, ἐνταῦθα τὴν
 ὁμοίωσιν ἄλλον τρόπον ληπτέον οὐ ταῦτόν εἶδος
 ἀπαιτοῦντας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἕτερον, εἴπερ κατὰ τὸν

¹ Order, arrangement, and proportion only appear when a form is "extended" in matter, and are not present in the archetypal unity of the intelligible form; they are its expression on a lower level. This is a principle of great importance in Plotinus's theory of art; cp. V. 8. 1.

make that principle virtue; but we consider it greater than virtue. But if that in which the soul participates was the same as the source from which it comes, it would be right to speak in this way; but in fact the two are distinct. The perceptible house is not the same thing as the intelligible house, though it is made in its likeness; the perceptible house participates in arrangement and order, but There, in its formative principle, there is no arrangement or order or proportion.¹ So then, if we participate in order and arrangement and harmony which come from There, and these constitute virtue here, and if the principles There have no need of harmony or order or arrangement, they will have no need of virtue either, and we shall all the same be made like them by the presence of virtue. This is enough to show that it is not necessary for virtue to exist There because we are made like the principles There by virtue. But we must make our argument persuasive, and not be content to force agreement.

2. First then we must consider the virtues by which we assert that we are made like, in order that we may discover this one and the same reality which when we possess it as an imitation is virtue, but There, where it exists as an archetype, is not virtue. We should note that there are two kinds of likeness; one requires that there should be something the same in the things which are alike; this applies to things which derive their likeness equally from the same principle. But in the case of two things of which one is like the other, but the other is primary, not reciprocally related to the thing in its likeness and not said to be like it, likeness must be understood in a different sense; we must not require the

10 ἕτερον τρόπον ὁμοίωται. Τί ποτε οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἢ τε σύμπασα καὶ ἐκάστη; Σαφέστερος δὲ ὁ λόγος ἔσται ἐφ' ἐκάστης· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ ὁ τι κοινόν, καθ' ὃ ἀρεταὶ πᾶσαι, δῆλον βραδίως ἔσται. Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν πολιτικαὶ ἀρεταί, ἃς ἄνω που
 15 εἶπομεν, κατακοσμοῦσι μὲν ὄντως καὶ ἀμείνους ποιοῦσιν ὀρίζουσαι καὶ μετροῦσαι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ὅλως τὰ πάθη μετροῦσαι καὶ ψευδεῖς δόξας ἀφαιροῦσαι τῷ ὅλως ἀμείνῳ καὶ τῷ ὀρίσθαι καὶ τῶν ἀμέτρων καὶ ἀορίστων ἕξω εἶναι καὶ τὸ μεμετρημένον, καὶ αὐταὶ ὀρισθεῖσαι. Ἡ μέτρα γε ἐν ὕλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ, ὁμοίωται τῷ ἐκεῖ μέτρῳ καὶ
 20 ἔχουσιν ἴχνος τοῦ ἐκεῖ ἀρίστου. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάντῃ ἄμετρον ὕλη ὃν πάντῃ ἁνωμοίωται· καθ' ὅσον δὲ μεταλαμβάνει εἶδους, κατὰ τοσοῦτον ὁμοιοῦται ἀνειδέω ἐκείνῳ ὄντι. Μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ ἐγγὺς μεταλαμβάνει· ψυχῇ δὲ ἐγγυτέρῳ σώματος καὶ συγγενέστερον· ταύτῃ καὶ πλέον μεταλαμ-
 25 βάνει, ὥστε καὶ ἐξαπατᾶν θεὸς φαντασθεῖσα, μὴ τὸ πᾶν θεοῦ τοῦτο ἦ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν οὗτοι ὁμοιοῦνται.
 3. Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν ἄλλην ὑποφαίνει ὡς τῆς μείζονος ἀρετῆς οὖσαν, περὶ ἐκείνης λεκτέον· ἐν ᾧ καὶ σαφέστερον ἔσται μᾶλλον καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἢ οὐσίας, καὶ ἥτις ἢ μείζων κατὰ τὴν
 5 οὐσίαν, καὶ ὅλως, ὅτι ἔστι παρὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν

¹ This doctrine of the two kinds of likeness may well have arisen, as Bréhier suggests, as an answer to the objection of Parmenides to the view that the Forms are παραδείγματα (patterns) (Plato, *Parmenides* 132D–133A).

² Soul is of course a god for Plotinus, though of the lowest rank; what we are not to believe is that it is the whole, or the most important part, of divinity.

same form in both, but rather a different one, since likeness has come about in this different way.¹

What then is virtue, in general and in particular? Our account of it will be clearer if we deal separately with the particular kinds; in this way that which they have in common, by which they are all virtues, will easily become clear. The civic virtues, which we mentioned above, do genuinely set us in order and make us better by giving limit and measure to our desires, and putting measure into all our experience; and they abolish false opinions, by what is altogether better and by the fact of limitation, and by the exclusion of the unlimited and indefinite and the existence of the measured; and they are themselves limited and clearly defined. And so far as they are a measure which forms the matter of the soul, they are made like the measure There and have a trace in them of the Best There. That which is altogether unmeasured is matter, and so altogether unlike: but in so far as it participates in form it becomes like that Good, which is formless. Things which are near participate more. Soul is nearer and more akin to it than body; so it participates more, to the point of deceiving us into imagining that it is a god,² and that all divinity is comprised in this likeness. This is how those possessed of political virtue are made like.

3. But, since Plato indicates that likeness is different as belonging to the greater virtue, we must speak about that different likeness. In this discussion the real nature of civic virtue will become clear, and we shall also understand what is the virtue which is greater than it in its real nature, and in general that there is another kind different from civic virtue.

10 *έτέρα. Λέγων δὴ ὁ Πλάτων τὴν ὁμοίωσιν τὴν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν φυγὴν τῶν ἐντεῦθεν εἶναι, καὶ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ταῖς ἐν πολιτείᾳ οὐ τὸ ἀπλῶς διδούς, ἀλλὰ προστιθεὶς πολιτικὰς γε, καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ καθάρσεις λέγων ἀπάσας δῆλός τε ἐστὶ διττὰς*
τιθεὶς καὶ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν οὐ κατὰ τὴν πολιτικὴν τιθεὶς. Πῶς οὖν λέγομεν ταύτας καθάρσεις καὶ πῶς καθαρθέντες μάλιστα ὁμοιούμεθα; Ἡ ἐπειδὴ κακὴ μὲν ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπεφυρμένη τῷ σώματι καὶ ὁμοπαθῆς γινομένη αὐτῷ καὶ πάντα συνδοξάζουσα. εἴη ἂν ἀγαθὴ καὶ ἀρετὴν ἔχουσα,
 15 *εἰ μὴτε συνδοξάζοι, ἀλλὰ μόνῃ ἐνεργοῖ—ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ φρονεῖν—μὴτε ὁμοπαθῆς εἴη—ὅπερ ἐστὶ σωφρονεῖν—μὴτε φοβοῖτο ἀφισταμένη τοῦ σώματος—ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀνδρίζεσθαι—ἡγοῖτο δὲ λόγος καὶ νοῦς, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἀντιτείνει—δικαιοσύνη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦτο. Τὴν δὴ τοιαύτην διάθεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς*
 20 *καθ' ἣν νοεῖ τε καὶ ἀπαθῆς οὕτως ἐστίν, εἴ τις ὁμοίωσιν λέγοι πρὸς θεόν, οὐκ ἂν ἀμαρτάνοι· καθαρὸν γὰρ καὶ τὸ θεῖον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τοιαύτη, ὡς τὸ μιμούμενον ἔχει φρόνησιν. Τί οὖν οὐ κακῆϊνο οὕτω διάκειται; Ἡ οὐδὲ διάκειται, ψυχῆς δὲ ἡ διάθεσις. Νοεῖ τε ἡ ψυχὴ ἄλλως· τῶν δὲ*
 25 *ἐκεῖ τὸ μὲν ἐτέρως, τὸ δὲ οὐδὲ ὅλως. Πάλιν οὖν*

¹ The reference here is to the passage of the *Theaetetus* quoted at the beginning of the first chapter.

Plato, when he speaks of "likeness" as a "flight to God" from existence here below,¹ and does not call the virtues which come into play in civic life just "virtues," but adds the qualification "civic," and elsewhere calls all the virtues "purifications,"² makes clear that he postulates two kinds of virtues and does not regard the civic ones as producing likeness. What then do we mean when we call these other virtues "purifications," and how are we made really like by being purified? Since the soul is evil when it is thoroughly mixed with the body and shares its experiences and has all the same opinions, it will be good and possess virtue when it no longer has the same opinions but acts alone—this is intelligence and wisdom—and does not share the body's experiences—this is self-control—and is not afraid of departing from the body—this is courage—and is ruled by reason and intellect, without opposition—and this is justice. One would not be wrong in calling this state of the soul likeness to God, in which its activity is intellectual, and it is free in this way from bodily affections. For the Divine too is pure, and its activity is of such a kind that that which imitates it has wisdom. Well then, why is the Divine itself not in this state? It has no states at all; states belong to the soul. The soul's intellectual activity is different: but of the realities There one thinks differently, and the other does not think at all. Another question then: is "intellectual activity" just a common term covering two different things?

² Plato uses the epithet "civic" of virtues at *Republic* IV. 430C, but without any implication of the sort of distinction made here. Virtues are called "purifications" in the *Phaedo*, 69B-C.

τὸ νοεῖν ὁμώνυμον; Οὐδαμῶς· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν
 πρώτως, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἐκείνου ἐτέρως. Ὡς γὰρ ὁ
 ἐν φωνῇ λόγος μίμημα τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ, οὕτω καὶ ὁ
 ἐν ψυχῇ μίμημα τοῦ ἐν ἐτέρῳ. Ὡς οὖν μεμερισμέ-
 30 νος ὁ ἐν προφορᾷ πρὸς τὸν ἐν ψυχῇ, οὕτω καὶ ὁ
 ἐν ψυχῇ ἐρμηνεὺς ὢν ἐκείνου πρὸς τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ.
 Ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς· νοῦ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ τοῦ
 ἐπέκεινα.

4. Ζητητέον δέ, εἰ ἡ κάθαρσις ταῦτόν τῇ
 τοιαύτῃ ἀρετῇ, ἢ προηγείται μὲν ἡ κάθαρσις,
 ἔπεται δὲ ἡ ἀρετὴ, καὶ πότερον ἐν τῷ καθαίρεσθαι
 ἢ ἀρετῇ ἢ ἐν τῷ κεκαθάρθαι. Ἀτελεστέρα τῆς ἐν
 τῷ κεκαθάρθαι <ἢ ἐν τῷ καθαίρεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ
 5 κεκαθάρθαι> οἷον τέλος ἦδη. Ἀλλὰ τὸ κεκαθάρθαι
 ἀφαίρεσις ἀλλοτρίου παντός, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἕτερον
 αὐτοῦ. Ἡ, εἰ πρὸ τῆς ἀκαθαρσίας ἀγαθὸν ἦν, ἢ
 κάθαρσις ἀρκεῖ· ἀλλ' ἀρκέσει μὲν ἡ κάθαρσις, τὸ
 δὲ καταλειπόμενον ἔσται τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐχ ἡ κάθαρ-
 10 σις. Καὶ τί τὸ καταλειπόμενον ἔστι, ζητητέον·
 ἴσως γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἦν ἢ φύσις ἢ καταλειπο-
 μένη· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγένετο ἐν κακῷ. Ἄρ' οὖν
 ἀγαθοειδῆ λεκτέον; Ἡ οὐχ ἱκανὴν πρὸς τὸ μένειν
 ἐν τῷ ὄντως ἀγαθῷ· πέφυκε γὰρ ἐπ' ἄμφω. Τὸ
 οὖν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῆς τὸ συνέιναι τῷ συγγενεῖ, τὸ δὲ
 15 κακὸν τὸ τοῖς ἐναντίοις. Δεῖ οὖν καθηραμένην
 συνέιναι. Συνέσται δὲ ἐπιστραφεῖσα. Ἄρ' οὖν
 μετὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν ἐπιστρέφεται; Ἡ μετὰ τὴν
 κάθαρσιν ἐπέστραπται. Τοῦτ' οὖν ἡ ἀρετὴ αὐτῆς;

¹ I.e., in Intellect, which is τὸ θεῖον just referred to.

Not at all. It is used primarily of the Divine, and
 secondarily of that which derives from it. As the
 spoken word is an imitation of that in the soul, so
 the word in the soul is an imitation of that in some-
 thing else: as the uttered word, then, is broken up
 into parts as compared with that in the soul, so is that
 in the soul as compared with that before it,¹ which
 it interprets. And virtue belongs to the soul, but
 not to Intellect or That which is beyond it.

4. We must investigate whether purification is the
 same thing as this kind of virtue, or whether puri-
 fication comes first and virtue follows, and whether
 virtue consists in the process of being purified or the
 achieved state of purification. The virtue in the pro-
 cess of purification is less perfect than that in the
 achieved state, for the achieved state of purification
 is already a sort of perfection. But being completely
 purified is a stripping of everything alien, and the
 good is different from that. If goodness existed before
 the impurity, purification is enough; but even so,
 though the purification will be enough, the good will
 be what is left after purification, not the purification
 itself. And we must enquire what that which is left
 is; perhaps the nature which is left was never really
 the good; for if it was it would not have come
 into evil. Should we call it something like the good?
 Yes, but not a nature capable of remaining in the
 real good, for it has a natural tendency in both
 directions. So its good will be fellowship with that
 which is akin to it, and its evil fellowship with its
 opposites. Then it must attain to this fellowship
 after being purified; and it will do so by a conversion.
 Does it then turn itself after the purification?
 Rather, after the purification it is already turned.

Ἡ τὸ γινόμενον αὐτῇ ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστροφῆς. Τί οὖν
 τοῦτο; Θεά καὶ τύπος τοῦ ὀφθέντος ἐντεθεὶς καὶ
 20 ἐνεργῶν, ὡς ἡ ὄψις περὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον. Οὐκ ἄρα
 εἶχεν αὐτὰ οὐδ' ἀναμνησθεταί; Ἡ εἶχεν οὐκ
 ἐνεργοῦντα, ἀλλὰ ἀποκείμενα ἀφώτιστα· ἵνα δὲ
 φωτισθῇ καὶ τότε γινῶ αὐτὰ ἐνόητα, δεῖ προσβαλεῖν
 τῷ φωτίζοντι. Εἶχε δὲ οὐκ αὐτά, ἀλλὰ τύπους·
 25 δεῖ οὖν τὸν τύπον τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς, ὧν καὶ οἱ τύποι,
 ἐφαρμόσαι. Τάχα δὲ καὶ οὕτω λέγεται ἔχειν, ὅτι
 ὁ νοῦς οὐκ ἀλλότριος καὶ μάλιστα δὲ οὐκ ἀλλότριος,
 ὅταν πρὸς αὐτὸν βλέπῃ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ παρῶν
 ἀλλότριος. Ἐπεὶ κἂν¹ ταῖς ἐπιστήμασι· ἐὰν μὴδ'
 ὅλως ἐνεργῶμεν κατ' αὐτάς, ἀλλότριαι.

5. Ἄλλ' ἐπὶ πόσον κάθαρσις λεκτέον· οὕτω γὰρ
 καὶ ἡ ὁμοίωσις τίνι φανερά καὶ ἡ ταυτότης τίνι
 θεῷ. Τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ μάλιστα ζητεῖν θυμὸν πῶς
 καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα, λύπην καὶ τὰ
 5 συγγενῆ, καὶ τὸ χωρίζειν ἀπὸ σώματος ἐπὶ πόσον
 δυνατόν. Ἀπὸ μὲν δὴ σώματος ἴσως μὲν καὶ
 τοῖς οἷον τόποις συνάγουσαν [πρὸς] ἑαυτήν, πάντως
 μὴν ἀπαθῶς <πρὸς αὐτὸ> ἔχουσαν καὶ τὰς ἀναγ-
 καίας τῶν ἡδονῶν αἰσθήσεις μόνον ποιουμένην καὶ
 10 ἰατρεύσεις καὶ ἀπαλλαγὰς πόνων, ἵνα μὴ ἐνοχλοῖτο,
 τὰς δὲ ἀλγηδόνας ἀφαιρούσαν καί, εἰ μὴ οἷόν τε,

¹ ἐπεὶ κἂν Harder: ἐπεὶ καὶ codd.

¹ What the soul sees, the realities which become consciously present to and active in it after its conversion, are the beings of the realm of Intellect, the Forms; they were continually present to it, but it was not conscious of them when it was unpurified and unconverted.

Is this, then, its virtue? It is rather that which results for it from the conversion. And what is this? A sight and the impression of what is seen,¹ implanted and working in it, like the relationship between sight and its object. But did it not have the realities which it sees? Does it not recollect them? It had them, but not active, lying apart and unilluminated; if they are to be illuminated and it is to know that they are present in it, it must thrust towards that which gives it light. It did not have the realities themselves but impressions of them; so it must bring the impressions into accord with the true realities of which they are impressions. Perhaps, too, this, they say, is how it is; intellect is not alien and is particularly not alien when the soul looks towards it; otherwise it is alien even when it is present. The same applies to the different branches of knowledge;² if we do not act by them at all, they do not really belong to us.

5. But we must state the extent of the purification; in this way it will become clear what we are made like and with what god we are identified. The question is substantially this; how does the purification deal with passion and desire and all the rest, pain and its kindred, and how far is separation from the body possible? We might say that the soul collects itself in a sort of place of its own away from the body, and is wholly unaffected by it, and only makes itself aware of pleasures when it has to, using them as remedies and reliefs to prevent its activity being impeded; it gets rid of pains or if it cannot, bears them quietly and makes them less by not suffer-

² I read here κἂν ταῖς ἐπιστήμασι with Harder (*Gnomon* 1952. 188), an emendation now approved by Henry-Schwyzler.

πράως φέρουσιν καὶ ἐλάττους τιθεῖσιν τῷ μὴ
 συμπᾶσχειν· τὸν δὲ θυμὸν ὅσον οἶόν τε ἀφαιροῦσιν
 καί, εἰ δυνατόν, πάντη, εἰ δὲ μὴ, μὴ γοῦν αὐτὴν
 συνοργιζομένην, ἀλλ' ἄλλου εἶναι τὸ ἀπροαίρετον,
 15 τὸ δὲ ἀπροαίρετον ὀλίγον εἶναι καὶ ἀσθενές· τὸν
 δὲ φόβον πάντη· περὶ οὐδενὸς γὰρ φοβήσεται—
 τὸ δὲ ἀπροαίρετον καὶ ἐνταῦθα—πλήν γ' ἐν
 νοητησίῃ. Ἐπιθυμίαν δέ; Ὅτι μὲν μηδενὸς
 φαύλου, δῆλον· σίτων δὲ καὶ ποτῶν πρὸς ἄνεσιν
 οὐκ αὐτῇ ἕξει· οὐδὲ τῶν ἀφροδισίων δέ· εἴ δ' ἄρα,
 20 φυσικῶν, οἶμαι, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπροαίρετον ἐχουσῶν·
 εἴ δ' ἄρα, ὅσον μέχρι φαντασίας προπετοῦς
 καὶ ταύτης. Ὅλως δὲ αὕτη μὲν πάντων τούτων
 καθαρὰ ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἄλογον δὲ βουλήσεται καὶ
 αὐτὸ καθαρὸν ποιῆσαι, ὥστε μηδὲ πλήττεσθαι· εἴ
 δ' ἄρα, μὴ σφόδρα, ἀλλ' ὀλίγας τὰς πληγὰς αὐτοῦ
 25 εἶναι καὶ εὐθὺς λυομένας τῇ γειτονήσῃ. ὥσπερ
 εἴ τις σοφῷ γειτονῶν ἀπολαύει τῆς τοῦ σοφοῦ
 γειτνιασεως ἢ ὅμοιος γενόμενος ἢ αἰδούμενος, ὡς
 μηδὲν τολμᾶν ποιεῖν ὧν ὁ ἀγαθὸς οὐ θέλει.
 Οὐκ οὖν ἔσται μάχη· ἀρκεῖ γὰρ παρῶν ὁ λόγος,
 ὅτι τὸ χεῖρον αἰδέσεται, ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ χεῖρον
 30 δυσχερᾶναι, εἴαν τι ὄλως κινήθῃ, ὅτι μὴ ἡσυχίαν
 ἦγε παρόντος τοῦ δεσπότη, καὶ ἀσθένειαν αὐτῷ
 ἐπιτιμῆσαι.

6. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων ἀμαρτία,
 ἀλλὰ κατόρθωσις ἀνθρώπων· ἀλλ' ἡ σπουδὴ οὐκ

ing with the body. It gets rid of passion as completely as possible, altogether if it can, but if it cannot, at least it does not share its emotional excitement; the involuntary impulse belongs to something else, and is small and weak as well. It does away with fear altogether, for it has nothing to be afraid of—though involuntary impulse comes in here too—except, that is, where fear has a corrective function. What about desire? It will obviously not desire anything bad; it will not itself have the desire of food and drink for the relief of the body, and certainly not of sexual pleasures either. If it does have any of these desires they will, I think, be natural ones with no element of involuntary impulse in them; or if it does have other kinds, they will only penetrate as far as the imagination, and that only when it is out of control.

The soul will be pure in all these ways and will want to make the irrational part, too, pure, so that this part may not be disturbed; or, if it is, not very much; its shocks will only be slight ones, easily allayed by the neighbourhood of the soul: just as a man living next door to a sage would profit by the sage's neighbourhood, either by becoming like him or by regarding him with such respect as not to dare to do anything of which the good man would not approve. So there will be no conflict: the presence of reason will be enough; the worse part will so respect it that even this worse part itself will be upset if there is any movement at all, because it did not keep quiet in the presence of its master, and will rebuke its own weakness.

6. There is no sin in anything of this sort for a man, but only right action. Our concern, though, is not to

ἔξω ἀμαρτίας εἶναι, ἀλλὰ θεὸν εἶναι. Εἰ μὲν οὖν
 τι τῶν τοιούτων ἀπροαίρετον γίνοιτο, θεὸς ἂν εἴη
 5 ὁ τοιοῦτος καὶ δαίμων διπλοῦς ὢν, μᾶλλον δὲ
 ἔχων σὺν αὐτῷ ἄλλον ἄλλην ἀρετὴν ἔχοντα· εἰ δὲ
 μηδέν, θεὸς μόνον· θεὸς δὲ τῶν ἐπομένων τῷ
 πρώτῳ. Αὐτὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ὃς ἦλθεν ἐκεῖθεν
 καὶ τὸ καθ' αὐτόν, εἰ γένοιτο οἷος ἦλθεν, ἐκεῖ
 ἐστίν· ᾧ δὲ συναρκίσθη ἐνθάδε ἦκων, καὶ τοῦτον
 10 αὐτῷ ὁμοιώσει κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν ἐκείνου, ὥστε,
 εἰ δυνατόν, ἄπληκτον εἶναι ἢ ἀπρακτόν γε τῶν
 μὴ δοκούντων τῷ δεσπότῃ. Τίς οὖν ἐκάστη
 ἀρετὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ; Ἡ σοφία μὲν καὶ φρόνησις
 ἐν θεωρίᾳ ὢν νοῦς ἔχει· νοῦς δὲ τῇ ἐπαφῇ.
 Διττὴ δὲ ἐκατέρα, ἡ μὲν ἐν νῷ οὔσα, ἡ δὲ ἐν
 15 ψυχῇ. Κάκεῖ μὲν οὐκ ἀρετὴ, ἐν δὲ ψυχῇ ἀρετὴ.
 Ἐκεῖ οὖν τί; Ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁ ἐστίν·
 ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐκεῖθεν ἀρετὴ. Οὐδὲ γὰρ
 αὐτοδικαιοσύνη καὶ ἐκάστη ἀρετὴ, ἀλλ' οἷον παρά-
 δειγμα· τὸ δὲ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἐν ψυχῇ ἀρετὴ. Τινὸς

¹ The allusion is to the procession of the gods in *Phaedrus* 246E4 ff. In Plato those who follow the first god, Zeus the leader of the procession, are the philosophical souls (250B7, 252E1); but Plotinus is probably using Plato's language to express his own thought and means by the First his own First Principle, the Good, and by the gods who follow, the divinities of the realm of Intellect.

be out of sin, but to be god. If, then, there is still any element of involuntary impulse of this sort, a man in this state will be a god or spirit who is double, or rather who has with him someone else who possesses a different kind of virtue: if there is nothing, he will be simply god, and one of those gods who follow the First.¹ For he himself is the god who came Thence, and his own real nature, if he becomes what he was when he came, is There. When he came here he took up his dwelling with someone else, whom he will make like himself to the best of the powers of his real nature, so that if possible this someone else will be free from disturbance or will do nothing of which his master does not approve. What, then, is each particular virtue when a man is in this state? Wisdom, theoretical and practical, consists in the contemplation of that which intellect contains; but intellect has it by immediate contact. There are two kinds of wisdom, one in intellect, one in soul. That which is There [in intellect] is not virtue, that in the soul is virtue. What is it, then, There? The act of the self, what it really is; virtue is what comes Thence and exists here in another. For neither absolute justice nor any other moral absolute is virtue, but a kind of exemplar; virtue is what is derived from it in the soul. Virtue is someone's virtue; but the exemplar of each particular virtue in the intellect belongs to itself, not to someone else.

If justice is "minding one's own business" does that mean that it always requires a plurality of parts for its existence? There is one kind of justice which exists in a plurality, when the parts which it orders are many, and another which is solely and entirely

γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ· αὐτὸ δὲ ἕκαστον αὐτοῦ, οὐχὶ δὲ ἄλλου
 20 τινός. Δικαιοσύνη δὲ εἴπερ οἰκειοπραγία, ἀρα αἰεὶ
 ἐν πληθει μερῶν; Ἡ ἢ μὲν ἐν πληθει, ὅταν πολλὰ
 ἢ τὰ μέρη, ἢ δὲ ὅλως οἰκειοπραγία, κἂν ἑνός ἦ.
 Ἡ γοῦν ἀληθῆς αὐτοδικαιοσύνη ἑνός πρὸς αὐτό,
 ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο· ὥστε καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ
 δικαιοσύνη ἢ μείζων τὸ πρὸς νοῦν ἐνεργεῖν, τὸ δὲ
 25 σωφρονεῖν ἢ εἴσω πρὸς νοῦν στροφή, ἢ δὲ ἀνδρία
 ἀπάθεια καθ' ὁμοίωσιν τοῦ πρὸς ὃ βλέπει ἀπαθὲς
 ὄν τὴν φύσιν, αὕτη δὲ ἐξ ἀρετῆς, ἵνα μὴ συμπαθῇ
 τῷ χεῖροσι συνοίκῳ.

7. Ἀντακολουθοῦσι τοίνυν ἀλλήλαις καὶ αὐταὶ
 αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὥσπερ κακεῖ τὰ πρὸ τῆς
 ἀρετῆς αἱ ἐν νῶ ὥσπερ παραδείγματα. Καὶ γὰρ
 ἡ νόησις ἐκεῖ ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία, τὸ δὲ πρὸς
 5 αὐτὸν ἢ σωφροσύνη, τὸ δὲ οἰκείον ἔργον ἢ οἰκειο-
 πραγία, τὸ δὲ οἶον ἀνδρία ἢ ἀνλότης καὶ τὸ ἐφ'
 αὐτοῦ μένειν καθαρὸν. Ἐν ψυχῇ τοίνυν πρὸς νοῦν
 ἢ ὄρασις σοφία καὶ φρόνησις, ἀρεταὶ αὐτῆς· οὐ
 γὰρ αὕτη ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ. Καὶ τὰ ἄλλα
 ὡσαύτως ἀκολουθεῖ· καὶ τῇ καθάρσει δέ, εἴπερ
 10 πᾶσαι καθάρσεις κατὰ τὸ κεκαθάρθαι, ἀνάγκη
 πάσας· ἢ οὐδεμία τελεία. Καὶ ὁ μὲν ἔχων τὰς

¹ Plotinus is here trying to fit Plato's definition of justice as "minding one's own business" (from the passage in *Republic* IV referred to in the note on ch. 1) into his own scheme of higher and lower virtues by means of his principle that the order and pattern in a lower multiplicity is always the expression of a higher unity.

² The doctrine that the virtues imply one another reciprocally is Stoic. Cp. *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* III. 295 and 299. Plotinus in this treatise, as Bréhier points out in his introduction, reconciles, by means of his doctrine of

"minding one's own business" even if it is the business of a unity. True absolute justice is the disposition of a unity to itself, a unity in which there are not different parts.¹

So the higher justice in the soul is its activity towards intellect, its self-control is its inward turning to intellect, its courage is its freedom from affections, according to the likeness of that to which it looks which is free from affections by nature: this freedom from affections in the soul comes from virtue, to prevent its sharing in the affections of its inferior companion.

7. These virtues in the soul, too, imply one another reciprocally, in the same way as the exemplars (so to call them) There in intellect which are prior to virtue.² For intuitive thought There is knowledge and wisdom, self-concentration is self-control, its own proper activity is "minding its own business"; its equivalent to courage is immateriality and abiding pure by itself. In the soul, sight directed towards intellect is wisdom, theoretical and practical; these are virtues belonging to soul; for it is not itself they, as is the case There, and the others follow in the same way. And if all virtues are purifications, in the sense that they are the result of a completed process of purification, that process must produce them all, otherwise, [if they are not all present], no single one of them will be perfect. Whoever has the greater virtues

higher and lower virtues, the Stoic view that the virtue of the sage is identical with divine virtue, one and indivisible, with Aristotle's view that the virtues are specifically human excellences, not found in the divine, which is above virtue as the beast is below it (cp. *Nicomachean Ethics* VII 1, 1145a 25-7).

μείζους καὶ τὰς ἐλάττους ἐξ ἀνάγκης δυνάμει, ὁ δὲ τὰς ἐλάττους οὐκ ἀναγκαίως ἔχει ἐκείνας. Ὁ μὲν δὴ προηγούμενος τοῦ σπουδαίου βίος οὗτος. Πότερα δὲ ἐνεργεῖα ἔχει καὶ τὰς ἐλάττους ὁ τὰς
 15 μείζους ἢ ἄλλον τρόπον, σκεπτέον καθ' ἑκάστην οἶον φρόνησιν· εἰ γὰρ ἄλλαις ἀρχαῖς χρήσεται, πῶς ἔτι ἐκείνη μένει κἂν εἰ μὴ ἐνεργοῦσα; Καὶ εἰ ἢ μὲν φύσει τοσονδε, ἢ δὲ τοσονδε, καὶ ἢ σωφροσύνη ἐκείνη μετροῦσα, ἢ δὲ ὅλως ἀναιροῦσα; Ταῦτόν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅλως τῆς φρονήσεως
 20 κινήσεως. Ἡ εἰδήσει γε αὐτὰς καὶ ὅσον παρ' αὐτῶν ἔξει; τάχα δέ ποτε περιστατικῶς ἐνεργήσει κατὰ τινὰς αὐτῶν. Ἐπὶ μείζους δὲ ἀρχὰς ἤκων καὶ ἄλλα μέτρα κατ' ἐκείνα πράξει· οἶον τὸ σωφρονεῖν οὐκ ἐν μέτρῳ ἐκείνῳ τιθεῖς, ἀλλ' ὅλως κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν χωρίζων καὶ ὅλως ζῶν οὐχὶ τὸν
 25 ἀνθρώπου βίον τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὃν ἀξιοὶ ἢ πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτον μὲν καταλιπὼν, ἄλλον δὲ ἐλόμενος τὸν τῶν θεῶν· πρὸς γὰρ τούτους, οὐ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους ἀγαθοὺς ἢ ὁμοίωσις. Ὁμοίωσις δὲ ἢ μὲν πρὸς τούτους, ὡς εἰκὼν εἰκόνι ὁμοίωται ἀπὸ
 30 τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἑκατέρα. Ἡ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον ὡς πρὸς παράδειγμα.

must necessarily have the lesser ones potentially, but it is not necessary for the possessor of the lesser virtues to have the greater ones. Here, then, we have described the life of the good man in its principal features.

The question whether the possessor of the greater virtues has the lesser ones in act or in some other way must be considered in relation to each individual virtue. Take, for example, practical wisdom. If other principles are in use, how is it still there, even inactive? And if one kind of virtue naturally permits so much, but the other a different amount, and one kind of self-control measures and limits, the other totally abolishes? The same applies to the other virtues, once the question of practical wisdom has been raised. Perhaps the possessor of the virtues will know them, and how much he can get from them, and will act according to some of them as circumstances require. But when he reaches higher principles and different measures he will act according to these. For instance, he will not make self-control consist in that former observance of measure and limit, but will altogether separate himself, as far as possible, from his lower nature and will not live the life of the good man which civic virtue requires. He will leave that behind, and choose another, the life of the gods: for it is to them, not to good men, that we are to be made like. Likeness to good men is the likeness of two pictures of the same subject to each other; but likeness to the gods is likeness to the model, a being of a different kind to ourselves.